חינוך כהנים וחינוך כלים

The first *mishna* in Maseches Yoma, in discussing the preparations that were necessary to ensure that the *Yom Kippur* service in the *beis hamikdash* was carried out properly, mentions the requirement to appoint a deputy to the *kohen gadol*. This was a precaution in case the *kohen gadol* was rendered unable to carry out those tasks which would be required of him over the course of the day, to ensure that there would be a replacement available. The *gemara*, when it comes to discuss the point, has the following discussion:

אירע בו פסול קודם תמיד של שחר - מחנכין אותו בתמיד של שחר. אלא, אירע בו פסול אחר תמיד של שחר במה מחנכין אותו? - אמר רב אדא בר אהבה: באבנט. - הניחא למאן דאמר אבנטו של כהן גדול זה הוא אבנטו של כהן הדיוט. אלא למאן דאמר אבנטו של כהן גדול לא זהו אבנטו של כהן הדיוט מאי איכא למימר? - אמר אביי: לובש שמונה ומהפך בצינורא, וכדרב הונא, דאמר רב הונא: זר שהפך בצינורא - חייב מיתה. ורב פפא אמר עבודתו מחנכתו. מי לא תניא: כל הכלים שעשה משה - משיחתן מקדשתן, מכאן ואילך - עבודתן מחנכתן. הכא נמי - עבודתו מחנכתו[[1]](#footnote-1)

The *gemara* makes clear that if the *kohen gadol* becomes *pasul* for any reason before the morning *tamid* offering was performed, then there is no problem in the deputy taking over, as he will be inaugurated as *kohen gadol* through his performance of the morning *tamid* offering.[[2]](#footnote-2) The *gemara* then raises the difficulty of how to proceed if the original *kohen gadol* is rendered *pasul* after having offered the morning *tamid*. The next opportunity for the deputy to perform an *avoda,* which is as part of the *Yom Kippur* service, when the distinctive eight garments of the *kohen* *gadol* are not worn, would prima facie not fulfil the criteria necessary for a successful inauguration.

Rav Ada bar Ahava therefore suggests that because the *avnet* (belt) that the *kohen* *gadol* wore as part of his dress on *Yom Kippur*[[3]](#footnote-3) was distinct from that of the other *kohanim*, that in itself would be enough to allow the *Yom Kippur* *avoda* to be considered an *avoda* performed in the distinctive clothes of the *kohen* *gadol*. The *gemara* points out that this is only an effective answer if we assume that that was in fact the case; however, whether the *kohen* *gadol* wore a distinct belt from other *kohanim* on *Yom Kippur* is subject to a lengthy dispute between Rebbi and Rebbi Elazar b’Rebbi Shimon as to what the belts of the regular *kohanim* were made of. Rav Ada bar Ahava’s solution is only legitimate according to the opinion of Rebbi that the belts of the regular *kohanim* were made out of wool and linen (*kila’im*), as opposed to pure linen (*butz*), which is what the *kohen* *gadol* wore on *Yom Kippur*.

Abaye suggests a second solution. A non-*kohen* who performs *avoda* in the *beis* *hamikdash* is liable to receive the death penalty. Rav Huna previously ruled that turning over a piece of meat from the *tamid* offering with a fork whilst it was being burned, which would cause it to burn more quickly, is enough to make a non-*kohen* liable for performing *avoda*. Since that is classed as an *avoda*, if the deputy *kohen* *gadol* were to turn over meat from the *tamid* with a fork whilst dressed in the clothes of the *kohen* *gadol*, that should suffice to serve as an inauguration, thus allowing him to perform the *Yom Kippur* service, which is only legitimate if performed by a *kohen* *gadol*.

A third solution is then suggested by Rav Papa, based on a precedent established by the way in which vessels in the temple were inaugurated. The vessels of the temple made by Moshe were inaugurated by being anointed with oil. Future vessels were not anointed and have a different method of inauguration. The very act of using them for the purpose for which they had been built acts as an inauguration. In the same way, Rav Papa suggests that simply performing the *avoda* of *Yom Kippur*, which is *avoda* that only the *kohen* *gadol* can perform, is itself enough to inaugurate the deputy as the *kohen* *gadol*. It is this third answer that I would like to discuss at greater length.

Seemingly, Rav Ada bar Ahava and Abaye would not subscribe to Rav Papa’s suggestion that the inauguration of a *kohen* *gadol* and the inauguration of *keilim* for use in the *beis* *hamikdash* are directly comparable. Admittedly, if Rav Ada bar Ahava is right that the *avnet* of the *kohen* *gadol* is indeed distinct from that of other *kohanim*, there is no need to come on to Rav Papa’s less comfortable answer, so he may not actually disagree. However, the *gemara* seems to dismiss his answer, as there is no attempt to address the question posed against him. However, Abaye’s solution, namely for the deputy to dress in the eight garments of the *kohen* *gadol* simply to turn over a piece of meat seems a lot of trouble to go to if the potential truly existed to simply have the deputy inaugurated for the service of the *kohen* *gadol* through beginning the regular *Yom Kippur* *avoda*. Additionally, Abaye’s approach would likely have resulted in a delay to the start of the *Yom Kippur* *avoda*, which again he would surely not have suggested had he believed that there was a simpler option available. Furthermore, it is not even clear that *m’hapech* *b’tzinora* is in fact classed as an *avoda* at all. Tosfos in M’ila and the Mishna L’Melech (quoting the Y’reim) seem to assume that is not an *avoda*, simply a *r’shus* (optional *avoda*)[[4]](#footnote-4). The Ramban, however, assumes that it is in fact an *avoda*, as does Rashi on our *gemara*.

**Why wouldn’t the *avoda* inaugurate?**

This question can be addressed from two potential angles. The first is that there may be a reason based on the *halachos* of inaugurating *keilim* for use in the *beis hamikdash* that would mean that a comparison cannot be made between the process used for them and that used for inaugurating a *kohen gadol*. The second is that the inauguration of the *kohen gadol* may be to serve a fundamentally different purpose than that of *keilim*. Needless to say, both of these angles complement one another, yet for greater clarity in the explanation of the issues involved, I would like to approach each in turn.

A possible approach for differentiating between the *chinuch* of *keilim* and the *chinuch* of the *kohen gadol* can be found in the Sifrei.

וימשחם ויקדש אותם למה נאמר והלא כבר נאמר וימשח אותו ויקדש אותו ומה ת"ל וימשחם ויקדש אותם מגיד שבמשיחתן של אלו הוקדשו כל הכלים לעתיד לבוא

“‘And they anointed them and sanctified them’ – what was the necessity of stating this? Surely [the Torah] has already said ‘and he anointed it and sanctified it’. So what does the repetition teach us? It informs us that through anointing these (the initial vessels of the *mishkan*), all future vessels are also sanctified.”[[5]](#footnote-5)

What this Sifrei suggests is that when the *gemara* says that “all vessels that Moshe made, their anointing sanctifies them (*m’kadeshtan*) and from then on, they are inaugurated (*m’chanechtan*) through usage”, it does not mean that usage and anointing are equivalent; rather there is a special *g’zeiras hakasuv* to tell us that because the initial *keilim* for the *mishkan* were anointed, it is as though future *keilim* were themselves anointed.[[6]](#footnote-6) One consequence of this would be that the comparison that Rav Papa made between the inauguration of *kohanim* and the inauguration of *keilim* may be illegitimate – *avoda* in and of itself cannot inaugurate in the case of *keilim* without anointing, so to suggest that it could in the case of *k’huna* would seemingly be baseless.

This Sifrei also seems to explain a discrepancy in the language of the *b’raisa* that the *gemara* quotes; why does the *b’raisa* use the word *m’kadeshtan* (sanctify them) in the case of the original anointing in the time of the *mishkan*, but *m’chanechtan* (inaugurate them) for future *keilim*? In light of the Sifrei, it makes sense; the *avoda* performed with later *keilim* does not sanctify them, as that was done through the original anointing. Using them for *avoda* merely recognises their status as legitimate *keilim*. This also fits with the way that the Rambam defines the word *chinuch* in relation to *keilim*:

והושאלה מלת חנוך בדברים אלה להתחלת העשייה, כאלו מרגילים כלי זה לעבודה זו על דרך הדמיון לאדם בתחלת למודו מדע מסויים או מדות מסויימות שיתרגל בהם עד שיקלטו בו כתכונה[[7]](#footnote-7)

He explains that the word *chinuch* refers to the beginning of usage, and that it causes the *k’li* to become used to doing the *avoda* that is performed with it – in Rav Kapach’s translation of the Rambam, he writes “*v’inyan hachinuch hu hahergel*” – the point of *chinuch* is accustomisation. Therefore, the idea of *chinuch* with *keilim* is not to give them a status that they did not previously possess, but rather to introduce them into regular usage.[[8]](#footnote-8)

Although potentially the same argument could be made for the *chinuch* of a *kohen* *gadol*, namely that the *gemara* refers to *chinuch* in his case, as opposed to *kiddush*, so perhaps an equivalency can be made between *k’huna* and *keilim*, this would be a false assumption. The legitimacy of the *chinuch* of the *keilim* through *avoda* is predicated on a *kiddush* already achieved through the initial anointing.

In fact, the Rambam’s language supports Abaye’s point of view, as it suggests that some sort of practical *avoda* such as *m’hapech* *b’tzinora* would actually be required in order for *chinuch* to be achieved. A suggestion that the *avoda* of *Yom Kippur* itself could be considered *chinuch* is, based purely on the language of this Rambam, counter-intuitive.[[9]](#footnote-9)

**INSERT SUBTITLE HERE**

Although this Sifrei offers a potential explanation for Abaye’s reluctance to accept Rav Papa’s suggestion, there seems to be a Yerushalmi that contradicts its premise.

כלי שרת מאימתי הן קדושין מיד או בשעת התשמיש אין תימר מיד ניחא אין תימר בשעת התשמיש כאחת הן קדושין ניחא של משה שנתקדשו בשמן המשחה ברם של שלמה כאחת הן קדושין ומתקדשין בכניסתן לארץ היו מפנין מתוך של משה לתוך של שלמה לא היה שם של משה כאחת הן קדושין ומתקדשין ובעלייתן מן הגולה היו מפנין מתוך של שלמה לתוך שלהם לא היה שם של שלמה כאחת הן קדושין ומתקדשין[[10]](#footnote-10)

The Yerushalmi discusses whether *keilim* used in the first *beis* *hamikdash* become sanctified from the moment that they are assigned as such by their owners, or whether they are only sanctified through usage.[[11]](#footnote-11) The *gemara* initially finds it difficult to accept the second possibility, as how could it make sense that they become sanctified only through having sanctified objects placed within them, given that the objects placed within them are only considered sanctified due to having been placed in a sanctified vessel? Logically, one must come before the other. The *gemara* points out that this problem does not apply to the initial *keilim* produced for the *mishkan*, as they were sanctified through anointing before they were used. Building on that, the *gemara* suggests a solution for the paradox for later *keilim*, namely that the contents of the *keilim* were placed in an original *mishkan* vessel, rendering them sanctified, and then placed in a new vessel, thus sanctifying it in turn. However, the *gemara* concludes that if an original *mishkan* vessel was not available, then we would accept the seemingly paradoxical logic of simultaneous sanctification. The *gemara* then repeats the same logical process for transference of *k’dusha* to *keilim* in the second *beis* *hamikdash*, coming to the same conclusions.

It seems obvious that the Yerushalmi does not accept the Sifrei’s suggestion of the initial anointing of *keilim* working for all future *keilim*, as if it did then it would not have assumed that a different rule should apply for the sanctification of *keilim* (dependent on whether an original *mishkan* period version was available). If it were true that the initial anointing was effective as an anointment of all future *keilim*, all would have the same solution as the easy one which the *gemara* presented as working for the original *k’lei hamishkan.* That is, their sanctification was not dependent on a paradoxical act of simultaneously sanctifying and being sanctified by their contents, but rather that having been previously anointed, their contents are simply sanctified by the *keilim*, which are already *kadosh*.

Although I am wary of the legitimacy of making a comparison between the respective languages of the Bavli and Yerushalmi, it is interesting that the Yerushalmi only uses the language of *k’dusha*, not *chinuch*, in its discussion. Given the distinction we made between those two *l’shonos* earlier, the choice of the Yerushalmi not to make the same distinction would seem to fit with the fact that it does not accept the position of the Sifrei.

Does the fact that the Yerushalmi seems to reject the Sifrei help us to understand Rav Papa’s position? On the one hand, it would seem to remove the obstacle in comparing *k’huna* and *keilim* that the Sifrei seemed to create, as we would no longer have to assume that the *chinuch* enacted on a vessel by *avoda* was predicated on a previous anointing. It may also be easier to assume that the logic of the Yerushalmi is the same as that of Rav Papa in our *gemara*, as the conclusion of the Yerushalmi, “*k’achas hen k’doshim u’miskadshim”* – they become holy and sanctify their contents at the same time, may be reflected in the Bavli’s parallel statement, *avodasan m’chanechtan*, which Rav Papa quoted. On the other hand, that very expression of the Yerushalmi poses a problem to Rav Papa’s answer; if it is indeed simply another version of the same rule, the Yerushalmi is clearer in regards to how it functions with regards to *keilim* – the vessel sanctifies its contents whilst simultaneously being sanctified via the act of containing sanctified objects. If that is the case, it is not simply an act of *avoda* that sanctifies the vessel; it is the specific act of containing sanctified objects. It so happens that containing sanctified objects is an *avoda*, but there is nothing implicit in the idea of *avoda* in general that would necessarily suggest that it could be extended to other things, like *k’huna*, which do not operate in the same specific way and circumstances as *keilim*.

Perhaps, therefore, as opposed to assuming that the different views of Rav Papa and Abaye are based on the two differing versions of the way in which *keilim* are sanctified in the Sifrei and Yerushalmi respectively, it is more sensible to suggest that it is actually a disagreement in how the idea of עבודתן מחנכתן operates in practice. Abaye understands its function in line with the way that it seems to be expressed in the Yerushalmi and Rav Papa understands it as a more general rule.[[12]](#footnote-12)

Part of why this is a better approach is that the way in which we understood the Sifrei seemingly requires reassessment. If we are to take it literally, we face a difficulty in explaining why there is even a requirement for the *gemara* to say that from the time of the *mishkan* onwards the *avoda* acts to inaugurate the *keilim*, as there is no indication that the original *keilim* of the *mishkan* required an extra level of *chinuch* beyond being anointed. If all future *keilim* are considered anointed, what is the necessity for the rule of *avodasan m’chanechtan*? It might make more sense to reinterpret the Sifrei as waiving the necessity of anointment for all future *keilim*, as opposed to rendering them as being considered anointed. It is questionable whether this fits with the language of the Sifrei, namely that “with the anointing of these original *keilim*, all future *keilim* became *kadosh*”. That is different from saying that it is as if all future *keilim* were also anointed, but practically it may mean that the same result is achieved, leaving us with the same question of the necessity of the clause of *avodasan m’chanechtan*.

If we assume that *k’dusha* and *chinuch* are separate stages, then that would resolve the difficulty, but leave us with another question, namely, why the *gemara* seems to imply that the original *keilim* in the *mishkan* only required the stage of משיחתן מקדשתן and not subsequent *chinuch*. It may be, therefore, that the Sifrei is in complete contradiction of the entire view of the *gemara* in terms of how the historical inauguration process worked. The Magen Avraham in Zeis Ra’anan believes this not to be the case, and writes that the Sifrei is halachically accurate. However, the N’tziv points out in Emek Han’tziv on the Sifrei that in Sanhedrin, where the *b’raisa* of *m’shicha* vs *avoda* is also mentioned, the *gemara* employs the same verse on which the Sifrei was based to learn that only *avoda* works to inaugurate *keilim* after the initial *mishkan* period inauguration through anointing, which we could also view as evidence that the Sifrei and the *b’raisa* are in direct contradiction to one another.[[13]](#footnote-13)

**The Rambam’s Approach**

The Rambam, however, must have a different understanding of the *gemara*. In Sefer Hamitzvos, he writes as follows:

והמצוה הל"ה היא שצונו שיהיה לנו שמן עשוי על המתכונת המיוחדת מוכן למשוח בו כל כהן גדול שיתמנה כמו שאמר (ר"פ אמור) והכהן הגדול מאחיו אשר יוצק על ראשו שמן המשחה. וכן ימשחו בו קצת המלכים כמו שהתבאר בדין מצוה זו. וכבר נמשח בו המשכן וכל כליו. ולא ימשחו בו הכלים לדורות כי בבאור אמרו בסיפרי (נשא עה"כ וימשחם) שבמשיחתן שלאלו כלומר כלי המשכן הוקדשו כל הכלים לעתיד לבא. אמר יתעלה ויתברך שמו (ר"פ תשא) שמן משחת קדש יהיה זה לי לדורותיכם.[[14]](#footnote-14)

The Rambam is describing the mitzvah to have oil which is specially made and set aside for anointing a *kohen* *gadol*, and with which several kings were also anointed. Given that he is discussing this special oil, the Rambam also mentions that it was used to anoint the *mishkan* and all of its vessels. He goes on to explain that only the vessels at the time of the *mishkan* were anointed, and instead of quoting the *b’raisa* of *avodasan m’chanechtan*, he quotes the Sifrei, that with the anointing of the vessels of the *mishkan*, all future vessels were sanctified. It is impossible to say that the Rambam understood the relationship between the Sifrei and the *b’raisa* the same way that we have, i.e. that they contradict, as the Rambam in *Hilchos* *K’lei* *Hamikdash* seems to assume that the *b’raisa* is halachically valid as well:

כל כלי המקדש שעשה משה במדבר לא נתקדשו אלא במשיחתן בשמן המשחה שנאמר וימשחם ויקדש אותם, ודבר זה אינו נוהג לדורות, אלא הכלים כולן כיון שנשתמשו בהן במקדש במלאכתן נתקדשו שנאמר אשר ישרתו בם בקודש בשירות הם מתקדשין[[15]](#footnote-15)

“All vessels used in the *Beis* *Hamikdash* that Moshe made in the desert were only sanctified through anointing with *shemen* *hamishcha*, as it says: And he anointed them and sanctified them. This was not practiced throughout all generations; rather, all vessels, once they were used in the *Mikdash* were sanctified through their operation. As it says: through which they will serve in the *Mikdash* – [meaning] that they were sanctified through their use in temple service.”

Therefore, we must ascribe a different approach to the Rambam when it comes to understanding the disagreement in our *gemara*. There are several problems with the Rambam’s approach to the *chinuch* of the *kohen gadol*, specifically based around our *gemara*. First, the Rambam clearly rules that the *halacha* follows the opinion of Rav Papa:

ומתקינין לו כהן גדול אחר שאם יארע בזה פיסול יעבוד האחר תחתיו, בין שאירע בו פיסול קודם תמיד של שחר בין שאירע בו פיסול אחר שהקריב קרבנו זה שנכנס תחתיו אינו צריך חינוך אלא עבודתו מחנכתו ומתחיל מעבודה שפסק בה הראשון[[16]](#footnote-16)

The Rambam rules unequivocally that if the first *kohen* *gadol* becomes *pasul*, the deputy takes over and simply begins doing *avoda*, even if the invalidation of the first *kohen* *gadol* happened before the morning *korban* *tamid*. The Rambam quotes Rav Papa’s language directly.

However, when discussing the general requirement for *chinuch* of a *kohen gadol*, the Rambam rules as follows:

וממנין כ"ג הוא ראש לכל הכהנים, ומושחין אותו בשמן המשחה, ומלבישין אותו בגדי כהונה גדולה שנאמר והכהן הגדול מאחיו אשר יוצק וגו', ואם אין שם שמן המשחה מרבין אותו בבגדי כהונה גדולה בלבד שנאמר אשר יוצק על ראשו שמן המשחה ומלא את ידו ללבוש את הבגדים, כשם שמתרבה בשמן המשחה כך מתרבה בבגדים[[17]](#footnote-17)

“We appoint a *kohen* *gadol*, and he is head of all *kohanim*. He is anointed with anointing oil, and we dress him in the clothes of the *kohen* *gadol*... If there is no anointing oil, we dress him in the extra clothes of the *kohen* *gadol*... Dressing him in extra clothes is just as effective as anointing him with the oil.”

The obvious question is, how do these two fit together? If simply beginning to perform *avoda* is an effective form of *chinuch*, then why does the Rambam not mention it when he talks about *m’shicha* and *ribui* *b’gadim* (dressing in extra clothes)? And if *m’shicha* and *ribui* *b’gadim* are prerequisites, and the performance of *avoda* is merely a *b’dieved* solution, then why does the Rambam make no distinction between whether the *kohen* *gadol* was invalidated before or after the *tamid*? Surely Abaye’s solution would be preferable according to that which the Rambam wrote in *Hilchos* *K’lei* *Hamikdash*!

There is another difficulty facing the Rambam based on Abaye’s answer in our *gemara*. The Rambam in the very next *halacha* in *k’lei* *hamikdash* after the one that we have just quoted writes as follows:

כיצד מרבין אותו בבגדים, לובש שמנה בגדים ופושטן וחוזר ולובשן למחר שבעת ימים יום אחר יום[[18]](#footnote-18)

“What is the procedure for inaugurating a *kohen* *gadol* through *ribui* *b’gadim*? He dons the eight garments [of the *kohen* *gadol*], and takes them off again. Then the next day he puts them on again, and so on for seven days.”

It seems that the Rambam does not view *ribui* *b’gadim* as meaning that the *kohen* *gadol* wears the extra clothes relevant to his new position and performs *avoda* in them – rather that he simply needs to wear the clothes, and that that in itself is sufficient. If that is the case, why does Abaye require the action of *m’hapech* *b’tzinora*? It seems unnecessary. Furthermore, the whole question of the *gemara* seems strange – if *chinuch* is nothing to do with *avoda*, then why is it more of a problem that the original *kohen* *gadol* was invalidated only after the *tamid*? Of course it is slightly easier if there is a reason apart from purely *chinuch* purposes for the new *kohen* *gadol* to wear the extra clothes, but it is still hardly a problematic situation if *chinuch* does happen to be the only reason[[19]](#footnote-19). If the Rambam is correct in this, how does he explain Rav Ada bar Ahava and Abaye?[[20]](#footnote-20) (Even Rav Papa is slightly problematic, the only defence there being that at least according to Rav Papa’s answer no time is wasted unnecessarily if *chinuch* can also be done without *ribui* *b’gadim* – though this brings us back to our first question.)

The N’tziv answers the second set of questions by asserting that it would not suffice to simply wear the extra clothes as the Rambam is of the opinion that if they are not performing *avoda,* *kohanim* are not allowed to simply wear the *bigdei* *k’huna*, due to the *issur* of *kila’im* (against the opinion of Rabbeinu Tam).[[21]](#footnote-21) Although the Rambam does rule that *ribui* *b’gadim* only requires putting the clothes on without any *avoda*, which would seem to be in contrast to this, since that in itself is a mitzvah, of course there is no problem of *kila’im*. If so, then how have we answered anything? The N’tziv explains that the Rambam only believes that the mitzvah of *ribui* *b’gadim* exempts the *kohen* *gadol* from *kila’im* during the seven days before he starts doing *avoda* – since in the case of *Yom Kippur* the *avoda* would begin straight away, that exemption does not exist. Hence the *gemara*’s question in general is valid, and specifically Abaye’s requirement for *m’hapech* *b’tzinora* makes sense.

How does the Rambam understand the different approaches of Abaye and Rav Papa? I would suggest, based on the fact that the Rambam makes no distinction between whether the *kohen* *gadol* was invalidated before or after the *tamid*, that he clearly views Rav Papa’s answer as rendering the *gemara* before it as irrelevant – Rav Papa’s answer must supersede the *gemara’s* initial assumption that some sort of *avoda* with clothes of a *kohen* *gadol* is necessary for *chinuch* – if that was not the case, the Rambam would not have deliberately subverted the *gemara*, which clearly has the initial view that there is only a problem of *chinuch* after the *tamid*, but not before.

That would imply that the Rambam views Abaye as answering limited by the idea that *chinuch* on *Yom Kippur* requires *ribui* *b’gadim* the same way that it does the rest of the year. Based on an idea by Rav Isser Zalman Meltzer, addressing a slightly different issue, it could be that *ribui* *b’gadim* only works as a method of *chinuch* the rest of the year, when those clothes are actually relevant to the *avoda* of the *kohen* *gadol.*[[22]](#footnote-22) On *Yom Kippur*, when the eight special clothes of the *kohen* *gadol* are not relevant to the main duty of the *kohen* *gadol*, *ribui* *b’gadim* is not an effectual method of *chinuch*.

The Rambam views the question of the *gemara* and the answers of Rav Ada bar Ahava and Abaye as assuming that *chinuch* through *ribui* *b’gadim* is the same on *Yom Kippur* as it is throughout the year, and then Rav Papa as understanding that actually *ribui* *b’gadim* is not relevant on *Yom Kippur*, so the only way to perform *chinuch* without *shemen* *hamishcha* is through actual *avoda*, which only works on *Yom Kippur* due to the fact that *ribui* *b’gadim* does not.

In the same way as throughout the year, part of the definition of the *kohen* *gadol* is that he wears four extra clothes, so too on *Yom Kippur* that which makes the *kohen* *gadol* distinct from the other *kohanim* is the performance of the *avoda*, which is why *chinuch* through *avoda* only works on *Yom Kippur* and not the rest of the year. If this is correct, it would explain why in describing the *chinuch* on *Yom Kippur* the Rambam only mentions *chinuch* through *avoda*, and in explaining the general rules for *chinuch* of a *kohen* *gadol*, he only mentions anointing and *ribui* *b’gadim*, and not *chinuch* through *avoda*.

**The Position of Rashi**

Rashi’s understanding of the *gemara* is also worth discussing. In the initial part of the *gemara*, he seems to assume, very simply, that the function of *chinuch*, at least in its application to a *kohen* *gadol*, is simply to make it obvious and recognisable that an individual who previously was not *kohen* *gadol* has now assumed that role. This is evident from the language that Rashi uses in his explanation of our *gemara*:

***במה*** מחנכין ***אותו*** - הרי עבודת יום הכפורים שאחר התמיד בארבעה בגדים היא, **ובמה הוא ניכר** שהוא כהן גדול מעולם, והיכן יצא מהדיוטות, שתהא עבודת היום נעשית בכהן גדול?[[23]](#footnote-23)

זהו אבנטו של כהן הדיוט - שאין חילוק באבנטיהם - איכא היכירא ביום הכפורים באבנט, לפי שאבנטו של כהן גדול משתנה ביום הכפורים להיות של בוץ.[[24]](#footnote-24)

Both in his explanation of the *gemara’s* initial question, and in part of his explanation of Rav Ada bar Ahava’s answer, Rashi emphasises the function of recognition of a new role in the *chinuch* process; his definition of the *gemara’s* question is ‘through what is it recognisable that [the deputy] is now the *kohen* *gadol*?’ This approach does seem to make the most sense in terms of how the *gemara* continues, both in its rejection of Rav Ada bar Ahava, which is seemingly based on the fact that the *avnet* would not necessarily mark the deputy out as being distinct from other *kohanim* after all, and in Abaye’s answer, in which he specifically mentions that he should wear the extra clothes of the *kohen* *gadol* before being *m’hapech* *b’tzinora*.

On a simplistic level this would seem to be because by wearing the extra clothes he is recognisable as *kohen* *gadol*. Although Rashi doesn’t mention the idea of recognisability specifically in his explanation of Abaye’s answer, he does not mention any other reason either, and presumably we are supposed to assume, given the lack of any further explanation, that Abaye’s answer directly addresses the question as Rashi explained it. Namely, Abaye is providing another way in which the deputy can do something that makes him recognisable as the *kohen* *gadol*. How does this fit with the *gemara* on 5a (of Maseches Yoma), where it is made clear that the wearing of extra clothes is a method of performing the mitzvah of *chinuch*, learned from *p’sukim*? Seemingly Rashi must understand that the reason behind the *chinuch* through *ribui* *b’gadim* is that it is a way in which someone becomes recognisable as a *kohen* *gadol,* and perhaps that the same is true of the way in which *m’shicha* – anointing – works to make somebody *kohen* *gadol*.

However, it is not clear that Rashi understands Rav Papa’s answer as addressing the issue of recognisability at all. Firstly, Rashi does not use the language of *hekeira* – recognisability – at all in his explanation of Rav Papa:

עבודתו מחנכתו - עבודת יום הכפורים עצמה, שאינה כשירה אלא בכהן גדול, וזה עובדה - מחנכתו לכהונה גדולה[[25]](#footnote-25)

Rashi simply uses the word *chinuch* without further explanation. Although it could be argued that Rashi does not feel the need to explain the idea of *hekeira* again, I would suggest that this is not the case for two reasons. First, if the idea is simply *hekeira*, how does Rashi understand the fact that Abaye and Rav Papa offered different explanations? Are they simply two different methods of *hekeira*? Secondly, as will be explained shortly, it is not straightforward to assume that Rashi can apply the idea of *hekeira* to the type of *avoda* which Rav Papa is discussing.[[26]](#footnote-26)

From a logical perspective, if we are to assume that Rashi’s explanation of *chinuch* (of *kohanim*) as being based on establishing recognisability of that person as *kohen* *gadol* stems from an understanding of that logic being the explanation for the effectiveness of *ribui* *b’gadim* as a secondary method of *chinuch*, then the *avoda* of *Yom Kippur*, much as it may be that it can only be done by a *kohen* *gadol*, would not qualify as a way in which somebody could be viewed as recognisable as *kohen* *gadol* from a *halachic* perspective.

I would suggest that there is some support for this perspective from another Rashi earlier in the *masechta*. On 3b, the *gemara* continues with a lengthy discussion as to why we choose to learn several laws regarding *Yom Kippur* from the inauguration of the *mishkan*, as opposed to using the inauguration of the *mishkan* to teach us about other times of the year. The final reason that the *gemara* gives is that just as during the inauguration of the *mishkan*, it was the first time that *avoda* was performed there (through the sacrifices offered on the *mizbei’ach* *hachitzon*), so too the *Yom Kippur* service was the first time that *avoda* was performed in the *kodesh* *kadashim*. Rashi there explains as follows:

ואם בשביל ששימש משה כל שבעת ימי המלואים - אין קרויה עבודה אצל עבודת כהנים, שהוא בלבוש בגדי כהונה ושל משה בחלוק לבן[[27]](#footnote-27)

Although Moshe also offered sacrifices on the *mizbei’ach* *hachitzon* during the seven days of *milu’im*, the inauguration on the eighth day is the first time that it is called *avoda*, as it was the first time that sacrifices were performed by somebody wearing the clothes of a *kohen*. Since Moshe was wearing white clothes that were only permitted for that particular moment in time, his sacrifices were not considered *avoda*.

Perhaps the same would apply in the instance of *chinuch* for a *kohen* *gadol* on *Yom Kippur* – the *avoda* is performed in clothes that would not be acceptable for *avoda* the rest of the year. In that case, the mere fact that the deputy *kohen* *gadol* was performing the *avoda* of *Yom Kippur* would not necessarily equate to an action which made him recognisable as *kohen* *gadol* within the halachically recognised parameters of that process.[[28]](#footnote-28)

To summarise, we have suggested that Rashi may understand Rav Ada bar Ahava and Abaye’s answers as being based on the assumption that the *ta’am* of the mitzvah of *chinuch* is *mishum* *hekeira* – to make the individual recognisable as *kohen* *gadol*. We have also suggested that to avoid conflicting with a *gemara* earlier in Yoma, it makes sense to suggest that Rashi understands, at least within the views of Abaye and Rav Ada bar Ahava, the function of *m’shicha* and *ribui* *b’gadim* in the inauguration of a *kohen* *gadol* as being one of inferring recognisability. This has led us to the conclusion that Rashi does not understand Rav Papa in the same way, as the *bigdei* *lavan* that a *kohen* *gadol* wears on *Yom Kippur* are seemingly outside of what *halacha* prescribes as activities which can give recognisability, namely *m’shicha* and *ribui* *b’gadim*. Finally, we have suggested that Rashi’s comments on 3b explaining why Moshe’s *korbanos* did not count as *avoda* may support this conclusion.

However, that interpretation of Rashi on 3b as being linked to a different explanation of Rav Papa’s understanding of *chinuch* actually raises a larger difficulty than it solves. If Rashi’s explanation of Moshe’s *korbanos* not being called *avoda* can also be applied to the *kohen* *gadol* on *Yom Kippur*, then how could Rav Papa even begin to apply the concept of *avodaso m’chanechto* when there is technically no *avoda* occurring. Clearly this would not make sense – of course the *avoda* of *Yom Kippur* is a real *avoda*.

So how do we square this with the Rashi about Moshe – is it in fact irrelevant to this discussion? Maybe a more subtle distinction can be drawn: The difference between Moshe’s *korbanos*, and Rav Papa’s idea of *chinuch*, is that had Moshe’s *avoda* been considered *chinuch*, it would only have been *chinuch* for after the *milu’im* were finished, meaning that no further *chinuch* would have been necessary on the eighth day. Therefore it makes sense to say that given that Moshe’s *avoda* was performed in a different way from regular *avoda*, and was only allowed temporarily, it should not act as a *chinuch* regarding regular *avoda*. Rav Papa, on the other hand, is primarily discussing how to perform *chinuch* so that the *avoda* of *Yom Kippur* can be carried out. In that context, even though the *avoda* of *Yom Kippur* is different to regular *avoda*, of course within its own paradigm the performance of the *avoda* of *Yom Kippur* in the temporary clothes which are appropriate to that *avoda* should be able to facilitate an effective *chinuch*. The result of this is that we can still view the Rashi regarding Moshe as being applicable insofar as it tells us that as far as *hekeira* is concerned, only regular *ribui* *b’gadim* or *m’shicha* would help, as explained earlier, yet if we view Rav Papa as understanding *chinuch* simply as a function of *hergel* or *haschala* (accustomisation), then Rashi’s understanding of the definition of *avoda* regarding Moshe is not problematic regarding Rav Papa’s explanation of *avodaso m’chanechto* here.

Therefore, we can conclude that within Rashi’s understanding of the *gemara*, the difference in view between Abaye and Rav Papa in how to answer the question of the *gemara* is based on a deeper question of the function of *chinuch*; Abaye understands that *chinuch* is simply a function of recognisability, whereas Rav Papa understands *chinuch* as an end in itself, a requirement for any process or position within the *mishkan* or *beis* *hamikdash* to begin its role in a certain specific way – “the entering of a person or vessel into a task in which it is destined to stay”.

1. Yoma 12a-b [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. A requirement for anyone to serve as *kohen gadol* is to undergo a process of inauguration, which in theory can consist either of anointment with *shemen* *hamishcha* (anointingoil), or performing an act of *avoda*, temple service, whilst wearing the special eight garments of the *kohen gadol*. Tosfos Y’shanim points out that in practice, the *gemara* only discusses the second type of inauguration as a potentially effective one, because in the second temple period there was no access to *shemen hamishcha*, which rendered anointing a practical impossibility. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. See Vayikra 16:4 [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Tosfos M’ila 10a s.v. *Hakol Modim*, Mishna L’Melech Bi’as Mikdash 3:19. Based on this opinion, many *acharonim* ask how *m’hapech* *b’tzinora* is permissible at all, given that *m’lacha* on *Yom Kippur* is forbidden. (*Avoda* can push aside the restrictions of *Yom Kippur*, but an optional *avoda* would clearly not have the same power.) [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Sifrei B’midbar, Parshas Naso, paragraph 44 [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. The Chasam Sofer (O.C. §37) explains (with several proofs) that when the *gemara* refers to *keilim* made by Moshe, it does not mean that any *keilim* made by Moshe were anointed; rather it refers specifically to *keilim* made by Moshe for use in the initial *avodas hamishkan*. Had Moshe made other *keilim* apart from those, they would have required *avoda* to inaugurate them, not anointing. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishna, Menachos 4:4 [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. This makes use of the Rambam’s definition of *chinuch*, but I am not suggesting that the Rambam would actually agree to this idea. The basis of assuming that the Rambam himself would not necessarily seem to subscribe to this distinction in the language of the *gemara* is that when he writes the *halacha* based on this *b’raisa* in the Mishneh Torah, he changes the language: הכלים כולן כיון שנשתמשו בהן במקדש במלאכתן נתקדשו (see footnote 11). [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. It should be noted that Rashi seems to have a somewhat different understanding of *chinuch* to the Rambam, to be discussed later [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. Yerushalmi, Maseches Yoma, 3:6 [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. Meaning that they have objects placed within them. The rule is that a non-sanctified object gains sanctity if it is placed in a sanctified vessel. The ‘usage’ referred to here is the vessel sanctifying things placed within it. The vessel will gain sanctity by virtue of having sanctified objects within it, these objects having become sanctified by virtue of being placed in a vessel. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. Perhaps as part of the idea of *gito v’yado ba’in k’echad*. For more on this, see Beis HaOtzar of R’ Yosef Engel, Vol. 2 K’lal 9, where he uses our *gemara* in Yoma as one of several proofs to establish that we only apply the idea of באין כאחד to cases which involve imbuing something with a *k’dusha* that it did not previously possess. He deals with the difficulty posed to this idea by the more well known cases of a *sh’tar shichrur* for an *eved* *k’na’ani*, or a *get* for a woman, by suggesting that in the case of an *eved* it adds *k’dusha* by bringing him closer to the status of a Jew, and that in the case of a woman there is a *g’zeira* *shava* between the *get* of an *eved* and the *get* of a woman. He also has another, more creative answer, though this is not its place. As an aside, I saw that he poses the same question as the one with which we are dealing, namely, as to why Abaye and Rav Ada bar Ahava do not offer the same solution to the *gemara*’s problem as Rav Papa, and suggests tentatively that they may both believe that we try to avoid the necessity of answering *ba’in k’echad* when there is another potential solution which could alleviate us of the requirement to do so. Nevertheless, he ends off by clarifying that he is unable to explain why it should only be a *b’dieved* answer – if it works then it works completely, what could the problem be? And if it doesn’t work then we would never say it. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. Sanhedrin 16b. The N’tziv goes on to suggest that it may be possible to resolve the problem, but the logical problem that I have pointed out in accepting the *Sifrei* as compatible with the *b’raisa* in our *gemara*, in addition to the different uses of the *pasuk*, still constitute fairly convincing evidence that they are in disagreement. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. Sefer Hamitzvos, Asei 35 [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. Rambam Hilchos K’lei Hamikdash 1:12 [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. Rambam Hilchos Yom Hakippurim 1:3 [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. Rambam Hilchos K’lei Hamikdash 4:12 [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. Rambam Hilchos K’lei Hamikdash 4:13 [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. This does fit very nicely with the Rambam’s opinion that it makes no difference whether the *tamid* has been offered yet or not, but since this opinion in itself is somewhat problematic, given that it is difficult to understand in the context of our *gemara*, this is not particularly helpful. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. Although the Rambam says that this process needs to occur for seven days, which would seemingly be the simple answer to the question, the Rambam also writes that he is already *kohen gadol* and can perform *avoda* from the first occasion on which he wears the clothes, if necessary. The Mirkeves Hamishna mentioned in the next footnote discusses the implications and extent of this at some length. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. Ha’emek Sh’eila, Parshas Sh’lach, Sh’ilta 126. See the Mirkeves Hamishna on the Rambam in Hilchos Klei Hamikdash 4:12, and the Shu”t Sho’el U’meishiv, second edition 3:9, paragraph beginning “*v’hinei harambam*” for a fascinating discussion regarding possible alternative answers to these questions. [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. Even Ha’azel Hilchos Avodas Yom Hakippurim 1:3 [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. Rashi, Yoma 12a [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. Rashi, Yoma 12b [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. In addition, Rashi’s own definition of *chinuch* involves no mention of the idea of *hekeira*. Rashi (B’reishis 14:14) defines *chinuch* as follows: “it is a language of the entering of a person or vessel into a task in which it is destined to stay”. Seemingly that is based on the conclusion of our *gemara* which follows the thinking of Rav Papa, as opposed to that of Abaye or Rav Ada bar Ahava. [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. Rashi, Yoma 3b [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. Of course, if an argument can be made that there is a parallel between Moshe’s *korbanos* during the *milu’im*, and the *avoda* of *Yom Kippur*, in as much as neither were performed with *bigdei* *k’huna*, so neither is a real *avoda*, then the problem goes beyond a change in Rashi’s explanation of the process of *chinuch* [↑](#footnote-ref-28)